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Defamation Privilege in Internal Affairs
of Religious Societies
Howard A. Shelley, Jr.*
THE NEED FOR INFORMED and interested government and ad-
ministration of organization affairs, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, has resulted in the development of a well estab-
lished conditional privilege in communications furthering those
objectives.
The basic rule of law, little changed in its broader scope over
the years in the United States, states that:
An occasion is conditionally privileged when the circum-
stances are such as to lead anyone of several persons having
a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly
or reasonably to believe that facts exist which another
sharing such common interest is entitled to know.'
Understandably, with the myriad types of corporations
ranging from churches and charities to giant industrial corpora-
tions and municipalities, the need for freedom of communica-
tion varies with the corporate makeup, purpose and administra-
tion. Thus the pronouncements of the courts or governmental
officials acting in their official capacity are generally absolutely
privileged while the actions of corporate officials of large com-
mercial ventures are only qualifiedly privileged.
That qualified defamation privilege itself has variance in dif-
ferent types of corporations follows. The latitude allowed will
apparently vary with the degree of self-government as well as
the purpose of a corporation. Courts are reluctant to interfere
in disputes between private associations and their members. 2
This reflects "public policy" as demonstrated by the basic tort
immunities of private charities,3 and extends itself into the in-
terpretation and breadth of the defamation privilege. That this
concept is narrowing as regards tort immunity of private
* B.S., Case Inst. of Tech.; M.B.A., Harvard Univ.; Fourth-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Rankin v. Philippe, 206 Pa. Super. 27, 211 A. 2d 56 (1965); Restatement,
Torts 596.
2 Local 57, Brotherhood of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 S. 2d 705
(1944); Hopson v. Swansy, 1 S. W. 2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
3 Dunsmore, Clergymen's Interference with Private Rights, 10 Clev-Mar. L.
Rev. 52 (1961).
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charities is evidenced by increased responsibility for tort
liability in recent years.4
For one class of non-profit corporations and organizations-
religious societies-the courts' reluctance to interfere in internal
disputes, including defamation, is further accentuated by our
traditional separation of church and state. There is a strong
public policy against civil jury trials of matters arising out of
the internal controversies of a church, especially after the ad-
judication of such controversies according to ecclesiastical law;
only a clear and compelling reason for civil intervention will
overcome the courts' reluctance to intervene. 5 This continues
previous legal thinking that courts should not do more than the
law requires in church controversies, if action by the courts
will widen existing breaches.6 When courts intervene, it should
not be on narrow technical grounds but on a broad view so that
the parties are likely to become reconciled and their disputes
forgotten.7 In Jackson v. Hopkins the court stated:
If there is one class of cases that, more than all others,
ought not to be encouraged, it is those involving contro-
versies in churches. It cannot be doubted that even when
temporal questions are brought into court the church whose
members are thus involved is likely to be more or less in-
jured.8
In church associations, mutual membership in the church9
constitutes sufficient interest to justify privileged communication
of matters of and pertaining to the affairs of the church.1 0 Thus
4 Andrews v. Y. M. C. A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939); Oleck, Non-
profit Corps., Orgns. & Assns., c. 8 (2d ed., 1965).
5 Rankin v. Phillippe, supra n. 1; Heil v. Stauffer, 289 Pa. 139, 137 A. 179
(1927); In Re St. Mary's Catholic Church, 296 Pa. 307, 145 A. 862 (1929);
Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at c. 25, 26.
6 Grosse v. Beideman, 239 Md. 283, 211 A. 2d 298 (1965); Jenkins v. New
Shiloh Baptist Church, 189 Md. 512, 56 A. 2d 788 (1948).
7 Rankin v. Phillippe, supra n. 1; In Re St. Mary's Catholic Church, supra
n. 5.
8 113 Md. 557, 78 A. 4 (1910); Velasco v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 200
Md. 634, 92 A. 2d 373 (1952); Grosse v. Beideman, supra n. 6.
9 Wise v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 252 F. 961 (8th Cir. 1918); Kirkpatrick
v. Eagle Lodge, 26 Kans. 384 (1811); "Churches in respect to membership
privilege are classified with societies and fraternal organizations to which
the same rule of qualified privilege applies."
10 Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P. 2d (1948); Red-
gate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900); Konkle v. Haven, 140 Mich.
472, 103 N. W. 850 (1905); Butterworth v. Todd, 76 N. J. L. 37, 70 A. 139
(1908); Farnsworth v. Storrs, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 412 (1850).
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any member can invoke the privilege so long as church affairs
are involved and the communication follows proper channels in
the church structure. Non-members cannot claim privilege un-
less the presentation of a charge has been invited or challenged."
Privilege is not restricted to formal meetings of committees or
tribunals but extends through preliminary investigations as well
as formal hearings.12 An example would be discussions between
two members pertaining to a minister's behavior in church
matters even if formal charges have not and may never be
brought.
Defeat of qualified privilege is based on an abuse of the
privilege. Abuse is usually through publication of the defama-
tory material outside of the group of common interest or through
proof of actual or express malice.
Publication outside of the group of common interest alone
does not comprise an abuse. Thus printing of defamatory mat-
ter in a church publication for members does not lose its privi-
leged status merely because the publication may also occasionally
be read by non-members. 13 Conversely, publication in a church
journal offered for public sale or widely distributed to non-mem-
bers represents an abuse of privilege.14 The determination of
a privileged occasion has generally been left to the court for
decision where the facts are not in question. 15 However, in some
jurisdictions, this is still considered a jury question.1 The
church cases tend to handle privilege as a question of law.17
This, of course, allows a court control over the protection of the
defamation privilege in church organizations.
What comprises malice necessary to defeat qualified privi-
lege has been continually challenged. Williams v. Kroger Gro-
cery and Baking Company provided that qualified privilege was
11 Remington v. Congdon, 2 Pick. 310, 13 Am. Dec. 431 (Mass. 1824).
12 Farnsworth v. Storrs, supra n. 10; Butterworth v. Todd, supra n. 10.
13 Redgate v. Rousch, supra n. 10.
14 Ibid.
15 Kemart v. Printing Arts, 269 F. 2d 391 (9th Cir. 1959); Dickens v. Inter-
national Broth. Teamsters, 171 F. 2d 21 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Driscoll v. Block,
3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N. E. 2d 899 (1965); McKenna v. Mansfield Leland,
55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N. E. 2d 166 (1937); Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa.
255, 69 A. 2d 520 (1949); Scianda v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A. 2d 586
(1963).
16 Hager v. Hanover Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 949 (W. D. Mo. 1945).
17 Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, supra n. 10; Rankin v. Philippe,
supra n. 1.
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no defense if it in fact appeared defendant was actuated by
malice in making the statements.1i
Malice, in case of communication conditionally privileged,
may be proved by showing personal feeling between the parties,
or by violence of language and manner of publication. 19 Con-
versely, malice means "something broader than ill will." 20
In church controversies, malice has been defined as "moti-
vation by any cause other than the desire to carry out the church
discipline in good faith." 21 This is in agreement with the doc-
trine that actual malice can be present without loss or abuse
of privilege if there is proper purpose.22
Older cases involving church controversies restricted malice
which can destroy privilege in suspension and expulsion cases
to those statements on actions which in their use consist of a
"pretense to cover an intended scandal." 23
It would appear that traditionally "malice" in church con-
troversies has enjoyed a more narrow construction than in other
corporations. Since a "degree of malice" interpretation of this
question would provide the courts with another way of avoid-
ing involvement in church controversies, it is interesting to note
that two of the principal church cases, Brewer v. Second Baptist
Church2 4 and Rankin v. Phillippe,25 both follow this thesis.
When words are conditionally privileged, the law simply
withdraws the legal inference of malice and gives protection
upon the condition that actual or express malice or malice in
fact is not shown.26 It presupposes absence of malice.27 Thus
18 Smith v. Agee, 178 Ala. 627, 59 So. 647 (1912); Short v. News-Journal,
212 A. 2d 718 (Del. 1965); Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N. H. 26, 203 A. 2d 773
(1964); Meyer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N. E. 2d 637 (1941); Adcock v.
Marsh, 30 N. Car. 360 (1848); Williams v. Kroger Grocery, 133 Pa. Super. 1,
1 A. 2d 495 (1938); aff'd 337 Pa. 17, 10 A. 2d 8 (1940).
19 Wise v. Brotherhood, supra n. 9; Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So.
34 (1923); Bigelow v. Bromley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N. E. 2d 584 (1941).
20 Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F. 2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965); Walker v. Courier-
Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231 (N. D. Ky. 1965).
21 Brewer v. Second Baptist, supra n. 10.
22 Flannery v. Allen, 47 Ill. App. 2d 308, 198 N. E. 2d 563 (1964); Rankin v.
Phillippe, supra n. 1; Restatement, Torts 603, Comment A.
23 Farnsworth v. Storrs, supra n. 10; Butterworth v. Todd, supra n. 10.
24 Supra n. 10.
25 Supra n. 1.
26 Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279 (1880).
27 Flannery v. Allen, supra n. 22.
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the plaintiff must assume the burden of proving actual or ex-
press malice.28
Previous case law made the presence of actual or express
malice a question for the jury in most jurisdictions.2 9 In recent
years there has been more of a trend to make the presence of
malice a question for the court,30 at least where the facts were
not in controversy.3 1
To earn qualified privilege the courts generally hold the
party communicating must believe the statement true.32 How-
ever, a literal interpretation here could produce conflict. Ex-
amples would be the secretary of the corporation, who pub-
lishes a defamatory statement over his signature of which he,
personally, may have expressed disbelief during discussion by
the voting body, or a pastor reading an expulsion from the pul-
pit, based on facts whose truth he personally doubted. In such
a situation, the privilege should undoubtedly be extended to
become, in effect, an absolute privilege since the party is acting
in an official or administrative capacity.
A vital element in the consideration of privilege is the privi-
leged occasion. Historically, American courts have avoided
questions pertaining to the "ecclesiastical function" of the church.
The proliferation of sects coupled with our traditional sepa-
ration of church and state3 3 makes it natural that this reluctance
to act should occur in fields such as doctrine, creed, form of
worship, or the adoption and enforcement of useful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership.34 That "ec-
clesiastical function" also includes many other areas of church
business as well is partially due to a desire of the courts to avoid
church controversies even in areas where they normally and
nominally maintain jurisdiction. 35
28 Kelley v. Dunne, supra n. 18.
29 Dickens v. Int'l Broth'd Teamsters, supra n. 13; Williams v. Daily Re-
view, Inc., 46 Cal. 135 (App. 1965).
30 Rankin v. Phillippe, supra n. 1.
31 Walker v. Courier-Journal, supra n. 20.
32 Swafford v. Keaton, 23 Ga. App. 238, 98 S. E. 122 (1918); Farnsworth v.
Storrs, supra n. 10; Butterworth v. Todd, supra n. 10.
33 Owen v. Rosicrucian Fellowship, 173 Cal. App. 2d 112, 342 P. 2d 424
(1959).
34 Swafford v. Keaton, supra n. 31; Marr v. Galbraith, 238 Mo. App. 497,
184 S. W. 2d 190 (1944).
35 Golden v. Brooks, 276 S. W. 2d 670 (Ky. App. 1955).
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Disputes pertaining to theological questions and matters
ecclesiastical in character are for decision by the church itself,36
according to its law and usages, and controversies involving civil
or property rights come within the jurisdiction of the civil courts
and are proper subjects for their consideration.3 7 The courts
will even abandon questions of civil and property rights to the
church if the church is organized to pass on these matters by
properly constituted church tribunals operating within the scope
of their authority.38 Thus decisions as to disputes over real
property decided by the proper church tribunals have been con-
sidered outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts. On occasion
courts will venture into this "gray area," 39 but generally they
will abdicate their responsibility. Matters concerning qualifi-
cations of applicants for membership, charges against members,
testimony in support of charges, publication of disciplinary ac-
tion, warning of members against members, suspicions of actions
against interest, are all privileged as ecclesiastical in nature.40
Where they are competent, ecclesiastical tribunals have ex-
clusive jurisdiction and their decisions thereon are binding and
not reviewable by civil courts.4 1  Where appropriate church
tribunals exist but have not acted to settle a controversy over
property rights, the civil courts will not initiate action, in effect
remanding to the ecclesiastical tribunal.4 2
The basic reluctance of the courts to act in church contro-
versies makes defamation privilege in internal church contro-
versies far broader than in other corporate areas. This produces
the anomaly of wider opportunity to defame with privilege in an
36 Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S. E. 2d 368 (1950). "When a person
becomes a member of a church he does so upon the condition of submis-
sion to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and, however much he may be dissat-
isfied with the exercise of that jurisdiction, he cannot invoke a civil court
as long as none of his civil rights are involved."
37 Whipple v. Fehsenfeld, 173 Kan. 427, 249 P. 2d 638 (1952), cert. den. 346
U. S. 813, reh. den. 346 U. S. 918, cited as controlling in Weber v. Weber,
189 Kan. 661, 371 P. 2d 147 (1962); Murr v. Maxwell, 360 Mo. 416, 232 S. W.
2d 219 (1950); Briscoe v. Williams, 354 Mo. 203, 192 S. W. 2d 643 (1946).
38 Golden v. Brooks, supra n. 35.
39 Carr v. Union Church, 186 Va. 411, 42 S. E. 2d 840 (1947).
40 33 Am. Jur. 132.
41 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall 679 (U. S. 1871); Owen v. Rosicrucian Fellow-
ship, supra n. 33; Church of Long Beach v. Harper, 83 Cal. App. 41, 256 P.
476 (1927); Briscoe v. Williams, supra n. 37; Heil v. Stauffer, supra n. 5.
42 Rowland v. Wilkerson, 389 S. W. 2d 627 (Ark. 1965); Heil v. Stauffer,
supra n. 5.
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area of our society where moral values and moral behavior are
most highly prized and acutely evaluated.
Defense of privilege rests upon the idea that conduct which
otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the
defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social im-
portance which is entitled to protection even at the expense of
uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation.43
Defamation privilege in religious societies is burdened in
interpretation by the strong doctrine of separation of church
and state coupled with the courts' reluctance to become involved
in the internal affairs of private associations.44 That over the
years this has resulted in establishment of a philosophy regarding
defamation privilege in church controversies broader in scope
than that available even to other private associations is apparent.
Rankin v. Phillippe45 draws together this philosophy in a
clear exposition emphasizing those interpretations of the abuse
of privilege and malice necessary to justify and continue the
courts' reluctance to act.
This can develop conflicts with the right to privacy of the
individual that will not be easily resolved, and yet must be, to
prevent the church from becoming the arena of privilege for
defamation with license.46
43 Rankin v. Phillippe, supra n. 1; Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178,
140 A. 2d 100 (1958); Prosser, Torts, 607 (2d ed. 1955).
44 Local 57 v. Brotherhood, supra n. 2.
45 Supra n. 1.
46 Dunsmore, Clergymen's Interference with Private Rights, supra n. 3.
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